Abstract-A novel decision theory is emerging out of sparse findings in economics, mathematics and, most importantly, psychology and computational cognitive science. It rejects a fundamental assumption of the theory of rational decision making, namely, that uncertain belief rests on independent assessments of utility and probability, and includes envisioning possibilities within its scope. Several researchers working with these premises, independently of one another, have remarked that when decision is made, the positive features of the alternative that will be chosen are highlighted, and that this alternative is opposed to a loosing alternative, whose unpleasant aspects are stressed. By doing so, decision makers construct a coherent framework that provides them with a sense of direction in spite of an uncertain future. This paper frames together contributions from different disciplines, often unknown to one another, with the hope of improving the coordination of research efforts. Furthermore, it discusses the status of this emerging theory with respect to our current idea of rationality. This collection might be useful in order to develop theories and models of decision making in uncertain situations, where consequences are unknown and possibilities must be conceived. It does not provide a simple solution, but it may lay a base for future developments.
I. INTRODUCTION
A CCORDING to the ancient Greek tale reported above, the fox was not smart. In fact, after measuring the probability to reach the grapes (by jumping), she preferred to change her evaluation of their utility (the grapes are sour) rather than updating her probability assessment (the grapes are too high).
The tale of the fox and the grapes entails a basic requirement of our idea of "rationality," namely, that judgments about the likelihood of certain events-in scientific terms, the probabilities of the consequences of certain actions-are made independently of judgments about the desirability of these events-in scientific terms, the utility of these consequences. On this presumption, the utilities of the consequences of an action can be weighed by their probabilities to yield the "expected utility" which, according to the theory of rational decision making, Manuscript received March 6, 2011 ; revised September 8, 2011 ; accepted November 9, 2011. Date of publication March 1, 2012 ; date of current version October 12, 2012 . This paper was recommended by Associate Editor S. H. Rubin.
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should be maximized in order for a decision to be qualified as "rational."
The theory of rational decision making has been criticized for not providing an adequate description of decision processes. However, most criticisms can be accommodated by slight modifications of the basic procedure. In particular, Ellsberg's paradox, which rests on differential sample sizes, can be accommodated by substituting additive probabilities with subadditive probabilities. Likewise, Allais' paradox, which is due to distortions caused by extremely unlikely events, can be accommodated by nonlinear transformations of utilities and probabilities as prescribed by Prospect Theory. (See [14] for both paradoxes.)
The case of Slovic's paradox is quite different. A long series of experiments have shown that preferences between two alternative bets can be reversed if subjects are asked to evaluate the selling prices for the two bets-e.g., lottery tickets instead of the outcome of lotteries [32] . Other experiments have shown that this occurs because when thinking about betting, people focus on the probability to win, whereas when thinking about selling a lottery ticket, people focus on what prize can be won-i.e., on utility [15] , [44] , [70] , [82] , [90] . Thus, it appears that human beings do not evaluate utilities independently of probabilities, just as the fox did not.
Preference reversal is destructive for the theory of rational choice. In fact, it suggests that preferences are neither stable nor coherent. However, if preferences are neither stable nor coherent, no utility function exists. Thus, preference reversal suggests that decision making should be viewed as problem framing and problem solving, rather than optimization of a given utility function. In this perspective, both probabilities and utilities must be discovered in the process of decision making, and not independently of one another.
Several attempts to reconcile preference reversal with the theory of rational choice have been made. Preference reversal can be accommodated with the theory of rational choice if either violations of transitivity [16] , [33] , or of independence [21] , [25] , or of completeness [12] of preferences are accepted. While the proposals to accept violations of transitivity or preference independence did not receive much attention because these properties are essential for our idea of rationality, the more recent idea of dropping completeness deserves some discussion. In fact, allowing preferences to be incomplete amounts to accept the idea that a utility function can be defined, at most, for only a few alternatives. Possibly, the simplest and most repetitive ones.
Thus, this stratagem actually suggests that the theory of rational decision making does not provide a guidance to decision making whenever the problem to be solved is sufficiently novel. A radically different theory of uncertain reasoning is in order, one where judgment is not decomposed into utility and probability.
Decomposition into a judgment of utility and a judgment of probability is made possible by the assumption that the set of possibilities is given. Both utilities and probabilities are defined on the possibility set and can be analyzed independently of one another because their common domain is assumed to be fixed. It is a limiting but unavoidable assumption of the theory of rational choice. 1 It is because of this assumption that the prototypical setting of the theory of rational decision making is that of a gambler facing a known game, such as playing dice.
On the contrary, a theory where judgment is not split into utility and probability may afford to include the formation of the possibility set within its scope, which amounts to include the cognitive processes whereby possibilities are conceived, modified, or forgotten. Its prototypical settings might be that of a firm revising its values and its experience in order to conceive a strategy for an uncertain future, a Government elaborating a longterm policy, or an individual taking fundamental steps in his life. In all these cases, the content of the possibility set is not selfevident as in the case of gambling games. Thus, the cognitive processes that yield it should be included in a decision theory.
Over the last decades, various scholars working in different disciplines have taken important steps in this direction. This paper puts together various insights, developed independently of one another, pointing to one single principle, namely, that novel arrangements of the possibility set are explored by posing binary questions. By reporting and linking these insights to one another, it provides a map to researchers in an emerging field.
Unlike many variations of the theory of rational choice, this emerging decision theory is questioning a basic feature of our idea of rationality, namely, the independence of judgments of value (utility) from judgments of likelihood (probability). It will be argued that, precisely because it rejects the current idea of rationality, this emerging theory has a potential for not being just a descriptive, but a normative theory as well. Foxes (and humans) may have good reasons to behave as the story tells; therefore, at least in some cases, we should encourage them to do so.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The ensuing Section II exposes some theoretical principles that are supposed to guide the formation and destruction of possibilities in the human mind. Subsequently, Section III illustrates the main thread of this paper, namely, the idea that decision is made by opposing an alternative whose positive features are stressed to an alternative whose negative features are stressed-hence, the title "Either, Or"-whereas Section IV reports on a computational model of this idea. Finally, Section V discusses the possibility that the decision principles outlined in the previous sections have a normative status. Section VI concludes this paper.
II. GUIDING PRINCIPLES
This section collects theoretical principles that may guide the construction of a decision theory where possibilities are conceived at the same time that beliefs are formed. The point of departure are a few statements made by G. Shafer regarding the rationale for: (a) conceiving novel possibilities, and (b) merging or discarding possibilities.
Shafer has been the first scholar who drew attention on the entanglement between value judgments and likelihood judgments: "My point is that the process of formulating and adopting goals creates a dependence of value [utility] and belief [probability], simply because goals are more attractive when they are feasible."
2 [74] . This is just the same reasoning as in the tale of the fox and the grapes-the fox found the grapes more attractive when she thought that reaching them was feasible-except that Shafer did not laugh at this feature of human nature.
Shafer's Evidence Theory [73] , which is also known as "theory of belief functions," accepts that a decision maker may be aware that the possibility set is not exhaustive. This is achieved by forbidding the operation of complementation on the possibility set; therefore, residual events cannot be defined. In order to stress the difference between the possibility set so modified and the one employed in Probability Theory, Shafer called his possibility set "frame of discernment." In the rest of this paper, Shafer's usage will be adopted.
Evidence Theory is concerned with the combination of pieces of empirical evidence in the human mind (e.g., a judge evaluating testimonies, a manager evaluating information provided by subordinates, etc.). The bulk of this theory does not seek to explain how novel possibilities are conceived, or old possibilities are merged or discarded. However, in the last chapter of the 1976 book where Evidence Theory was first presented [73] , Shafer speculated on a decision maker who creatively builds the possibilities she envisions:
Like any creative act, the act of constructing a frame of discernment does not lend itself to thorough analysis. However, we can pick out two considerations that influence it: (1) we want our evidence to interact in an interesting way, and (2) we do not want it to exhibit too much internal conflict.
Two items of evidence can always be said to interact, but they interact in an interesting way only if they jointly support a proposition more interesting than the propositions supported by either alone. (. . .) Since it depends on what we are interested in, any judgment as to whether our frame is successful in making our evidence interact in an interesting way is a subjective one. However, since interesting interactions can always be destroyed by loosening relevant assumptions and, thus, enlarging our frame, it is clear that our desire for interesting interaction will incline us toward abridging or tightening our frame.
Our desire to avoid excessive internal conflict in our evidence will have precisely the opposite effect: It will incline us toward enlarging or loosening our frame. For internal conflict is itself a form of interaction-the most extreme form of it. In addition, it too tends to increase as the frame is tightened, and decrease as it is loosened. Glenn Shafer, A Mathematical Theory of Evidence [73] , Ch. XII.
In order to understand the aforementioned quotation, it is essential to remark that Evidence Theory's frame of discernment has a cognitive flavor that is foreign to Probability Theory's possibility set. The frame of discernment is a mental representation of the empirical evidence available to the decision maker. Empirical evidence is classified into mental categories, and these mental categories are the possibilities envisioned on the frame of discernment.
By "abridging or tightening the frame," Shafer meant sectioning the empirical evidence into finer mental categories in order to distinguish interesting details. The opposite strategy is that of "enlarging or loosening the frame," i.e., lumping empirical evidence into broader categories in order to ignore details that would contradict one another.
Consider, for instance, the case of States fighting against terrorist attacks carried out by groups claiming an Islamic inspiration. Tightening the frame of discernment may mean making efforts to distinguish between peaceful and violent religious interpretations, between different denominations within Islam, between spontaneous efforts and State-financed activities, between terroristic groups with global goals and terroristic groups with local aspirations-such as independence-and so on, making distinctions of any kind. By contrast, loosening the frame of discernment means making an effort to discard irrelevant details in order to arrive at practical classifications, e.g., which actors must be simply fought, which ones can be taken as allies, and which ones will behave as neutral observers.
It is clear that any decision process involves a continuous back-and-forth between tightening and loosening the frame of discernment. A decision theory is valuable to the extent that it identifies general principles upon which the frame of discernment should be either tightened or loosened, as well as the cognitive processes whereby these goals are accomplished.
In order to avoid possible misunderstandings with economically minded readers, it is worth to emphasize that looking for rationales to change a frame of discernment has nothing to do with the following: 1) Defining a cost function against which the number of possibilities would be traded. Although the cognitive processes whereby a frame of discernment is changed can ex post be subsumed by an objective function with a positive term representing the advantages of envisioning many possibilities and a negative term representing the mental effort that they require, by assuming ex ante the existence of one such function one would take as solved the problem that this paper seeks to solve. 2) Trading the number of possibilities considered by the decision maker with the mistakes connected with choosing the "wrong" possibility. 3 In fact, this is just another form of the aforementioned cost function, where "mental costs" are exchanged for "making mistakes." On the contrary, the following principles are relevant to the issue of tightening or loosening the frame of discernment.
Tightening the frame of discernment entails the creative act of conceiving novel possibilities. This is a difficult domain, for creativity cannot be formalized. However, even creative acts may follow some general scheme. Some experiments with inanimate materials were able to reproduce the arousal of interest in environmental stimuli and the birth of receptor organs in living beings. In these experiments, an electrical current formed structures that were shaped by signals that the structures themselves would detect and that would be beneficial for their growth. Through interactions with the environment, these devices evolved an "interest" toward particular signals to which they would attach a meaning-that of being beneficial, or not. Notably, such devices reproduced the arousal of novel possibilities, in the sense that they coupled information (stimuli) to a meaning. Thus, it is important to remark that they worked if (1) they were sufficiently flexible and explorative to form a large number of structures, and if (2) some of these structures were reinforced by particular environmental signals [8] . These conditions may be translated back into the domain of human decision making, suggesting that in order for novel possibilities and novel meanings to be generated (1) a decision maker must be sufficiently flexible to apply available knowledge onto uncharted domains, and (2) the environment must provide a feedback that affects the decision maker, either positively or negatively. If this feedback is not strong enough, a new exploration should be undertaken. Indeed, research in the economics of innovation has shown that firms make radical innovations by transposing old knowledge into new fields and subsequently reacting to the feedback provided by the new field of operations, an observation where one may easily recognize the two conditions above [50] . Note, however, that since humans have the power to ignore environmental feedback, the second condition should be possibly split in two parts, obtaining in the end the following conditions to conceive novel possibilities: (1) a search procedure whereby novel hypotheses are explored, (2a) an environment that provides a feedback, and (2b) a subject who accepts to change as a consequence of this feedback. Loosening the frame of discernment means that the picture of reality is simplified until one possibility stands out as the best conceivable solution. Thus, loosening the frame of discernment is the final step before making a decision. G. Shackle, an economist who worked at a time when the theory of rational decision making was still under development, outlined a decision theory that in its verbal statements anticipated the mathematical framework that would be set out by Shafer. Furthermore, Shackle assumed that individuals arrive at making their decisions by observing the output of an ascendancy function showing the worst and the best conceivable hypotheses. With his own wording, "the extremes in the desirability-undesirability ordering" [72] . Shackle explained "ascendancy" as "power of fascination." The "extremes in the desirability-undesirability ordering" were also called "focus elements," where "by (. . .) focus element, we mean an element (. . .) which has some special and extraordinary power to command and concentrate upon itself the decision maker's attention." Shackle assumed that for each hypothesis a decision maker is able to entertain, (s)he is also able to think of a neutral reference point and, from there on, two "focus elements" with opposite attractiveness [72] . Shackle neither tested his theory nor attempted to establish any link with theoretical or applied psychology. His decision theory, which is made of pure verbal statements, was forgotten in the light of the elegance and simplicity of the emerging theory of rational decision making. Today, while the theory of rational decision making is showing serious creeks, certain empirical findings in experimental psychology are pointing to the same path identified by Shackle out of personal introspection. This will be the subject of Section III.
The previous considerations about tightening and loosening the frame of discernment might constitute the bulk of a new emerging decision theory. In honor of G. Shackle, this decision theory will be named after him henceforth. In this new version of Shackle's decision theory, decision making would be viewed as composed by: (1) a phase of exploration and invention of novel possibilities (tightening the frame of discernment); and (2) a phase where the positive features of one alternative are emphasized and contrasted to a bad alternative (loosening the frame of discernment). Decision making would consist of alternatively carrying out these two steps: back and forth.
All issues that are concerned with loosening the frame of discernment (focusing on one possibility) are easier to handle than issues on tightening the decision frame (adding a novel possibility). The ensuing Sections III and IV are concerned with focusing on one possibility in order to arrive at a decision. However, the issue of conceiving novel possibilities will be considered again in Section V, which deals with issues of descriptiveness and normativeness.
III. QUEST FOR COHERENCE
There exist several documented situations, where decision makers focus very early on one single alternative. One famous example is Schelling's pure coordination games [69] , which have shown that most players make the same choice on assignments such selecting a meeting point on a map, or a natural number. Another example can be found among the "fast and frugal heuristics" discovered by Gigerenzer and his associates [18] , one of which consists of ordering alternatives according to one single, salient aspect. Finally, a long sequence of empirical examples is provided by Klein's "naturalistic decision making" research stream [26] . Fig. 1 . Before a decision is made, subjects emphasize the positive aspects of the alternative that they will select while denigrating a competing alternative, which in the end they will discard. Freely adapted from [34] .
For instance, the preference reversals of Section I can be explained by assuming that decision makers frame their decision problem around the probability to win if they are asked to play the game, or around the possible gains if they are asked to sell their lottery ticket. In this case, the salience of the probability to win, as well as the salience of the possible gains, is clearly constructed by the decision maker [1] , [45] , [80] .
Much empirical research has highlighted that decision makers are eager to utilize even trivial cues to draw sophisticated inferences and attribute causality to salient factors, and that they are unaware of doing so. In particular, decision makers have been shown to routinely construct reasons to justify their choices to others and to themselves, both before and after a decision is made [30] , [75] . Postdecisional justification of decisions is undisputed in cognitive psychology, whereas predecisional construction of saliency is a critical issue. Possibly, precisely because it upsets popular assumptions about rationality.
Nevertheless, precisely predecisional construction of saliency is relevant to this paper. The stream of empirical research shedding light on predecisional construction of preferences is increasingly wide. Their common finding is that decision makers focus quite early on one single alternative. The time remaining before a decision is made is spent emphasizing the positive aspects of the alternative toward which a decision maker is attracted and denigrating the remaining alternatives. At the end of this process, a decision maker has convinced herself that the selected alternative is much better than all others [36] , [37] , [83] (early findings) [2] , [11] , [13] , [46] , [91] , [92] , [94] (the bulk of experimental findings) [65] - [68] , [81] , [88] (experimental findings focused on specific fields) [19] , [34] , [57] , [77] , [78] (experimental findings in parallel with modeling).
Notably, these findings are consistent with Shackle's description of decision making (see Section II). Perhaps, a slight difference is that in Shackle's account, it was not clear that the two alternatives that are considered "the best one" and "the worst one" are constructed as such by the human mind.
Typically, the empirical evidence collected in the above experiments is presented-at least in the most recent publicationsas in Fig. 1 . The subjects of these experiments are presented with rather complex problems and are interviewed or otherwise probed while making their decision-typically, at three points in time. Responses highlight that, well before a decision is made, the positive aspects of the alternative that will be selected are emphasized, while, at the same time, the negative aspects of a competing alternative are stressed. A methodological exception can be found in [65] and [66] , which is focused on consumers' choices.
Quite often, empirical evidence has been collected in conjunction with theory development. Indeed, several psychologists have included the process of bolstering the advantages of one promising alternative and the disadvantages of all other alternatives in their theories of decision making. These theories are now reviewed in time order.
Mills' Choice Certainty Theory (CCT, 1968) stated that if decision makers were perfectly uncertain among a set of alternatives, then their choice depended on which alternative was favored by the available information. However, if they were somewhat certain that one alternative was best, then they would select information in order to favor that alternative [39] .
CCT is important, because for the first time, a decision theory admitted that the evaluation of alternatives could be distorted in order to arrive at a decision. By comparison, its contemporary theory of cognitive dissonance stressed that the evaluation of alternatives could be distorted after a decision was made in order to minimize regret, but not before decision making. However, note that CCT considered the distortion of evaluation a consequence of biased information gathering, rather than a genuine psychic process. Therefore, CCT did admit a predecisional distortion of evaluation, but actually not a predecisional distortion of preferences.
Janis and Mann's Conflict Theory (CT, 1977) of decision making focused on decisions involving profound, eventually destructive consequences [24] . According to CT, if a decision maker faced serious risks both in the case she changed her course of action and in the case she did not, and if she had no hope to find a better solution, then a state of "defensive avoidance" of decisions ensued. This could take the form of procrastinating decision, or of shifting responsibility, or of bolstering the positive aspects of the least objectionable alternative. Fig. 2 illustrates the conditions leading to defensive avoidance in CT.
Janis and Mann specified under which conditions a decision maker would resort to defensive avoidance, as well as under which conditions defensive avoidance would take the form of changing preferences. It is a real endogenous process of preference change, which is triggered by specific psychic conditions. However, according to CT, only in a few special occasions the positive aspects of the least objectionable alternative would be bolstered. CT did not take this as a main ingredient of decision making.
Kuhl's Theory of Action Control (TAC, 1982) postulated that an individual could find himself in one among two different moods [27] , [28] . In the mood labeled "state orientation," an individual would be excessively focused on his past, present, or future states; therefore, he would not attend to any action plan which may bring about a change. On the contrary, in the mood labeled "action orientation," an individual would seek to implement an action plan focusing simultaneously on the present state, the desired future state, the discrepancy between them, and the alternative actions that may turn the present state into the desired state.
According to TAC, action orientation should be protected against tendencies toward state orientation. TAC pointed to three mechanisms to keep the action orientation going: 1) quick termination of action-oriented decision making in order to shield it from state-oriented alternatives; 2) selective attention to information that is relevant to an action-oriented decision; and 3) emotional arousal of an action-oriented alternative. Note that (2) was akin to predecisional bias as in CTT, whereas (3) implied a true change of preferences as in CT.
The real novelty about TAC is that preference modification is no longer considered a wrong way of reasoning, but rather a good means to achieve and maintain a desirable orientation. Preferences are not inadvertently "distorted," but willingly modified.
However, the breakthrough came with Montgomery's Search for Dominance Structure Theory (SDS, 1983) [40] - [42] , [48] . According to SDS, emphasizing the positive aspects of one alternative while denigrating the other alternatives was the essential step of decision making. SDS claimed that even without additional information, decision makers would engage in a search for a coherent framing of available alternatives. At the end of this search, one alternative would stand out as the best one, whereas all other alternatives were depicted in their worst aspects. SDS claimed also that the "best" alternative was, generally, selected quite early in the decision process, well before a decision was made. According to SDS, most of the time employed in decision making went in constructing a justification for an alternative that was actually chosen on other grounds.
SDS also provided a crude description of the processes employed by a decision maker. Fig. 3 reports their flowchart. Fig. 3 . Flowchart of SDS, after [41] and [48] .
The distinctive block of SDS was the one where preferences were modified in order to make one alternative dominate the others (dominance structuring). This block included bolstering the positive features of one alternative, de-emphasizing the positive features of all other alternatives, canceling alternatives from the frame of discernment, and collapsing distinct alternatives into one broad alternative (note that canceling alternatives and collapsing alternatives mean loosening the frame of discernment in Shafer's parlance). If these operations were carried out with sufficient skill on a sufficiently differentiated initial set of alternatives, a decision maker ended up contemplating one "good" alternative that had a number of attractive features with one "bad" alternative that could actually lump together several alternatives whose interesting features had been de-emphasized.
SDS could illustrate search for dominance as either a pure mental construction or an interactive process that would include a search for better information. In this second case, decision was reached after a series of steps where the frame of discernment was alternatively tightened and loosened.
SDS ascribed to decision makers the ability to apply the dominance structuring operations to a different alternative from the one that was initially preferred. Furthermore, SDS contemplated the possibility of postponing decision as well as that of not making any decision at all.
Svenson's Differentiation-Consolidation Theory (DC, 1992) [84] - [86] was quite similar to SDS. According to Svenson and Hill [88] , the main difference was that DC included postdecisional reevaluation of alternatives (consolidation) besides predecisional evaluation (differentiation), whereas SDS did not-at least, in its first version. However, postdecisional reevaluation of alternatives, i.e., a bias to confirm the goodness of any choice that has been made, was known and accepted by the theory of cognitive dissonance long before the empirical studies that stimulated the aforementioned theories were carried out. Thus, DC may be understood as a refinement of SDS in order to link it to the findings of an otherwise radically different theory (the theory of cognitive dissonance, which concerns postdecisional reevaluation of alternatives and assumes rational decision making). There is empirical evidence claiming that the desire for coherence (by means of predecisional differentiation) is a much stronger motivation for decision making than the desire to avoid postdecisional regret (by means of postdecisional reevaluation) [93] ; therefore, adding postdecisional reevaluation of alternatives to a decision theory based on predecisional bias is a sensible improvement that does not imply any radical change.
The wave of empirical research that suggested the aforementioned theories triggered a parallel wave of research focused on group decision making. Jurors were shown to arrive at a verdict by creating consensus around an interpretation that was identified quite early in the debates, whereas the compromises and tradeoffs that the theory of rational decision making would predict were shown to be rare [52] - [54] (see [55] and [56] for a more comprehensive and theoretical framing). Similarly, boards of managers and financial operators deciding whether a risky investment should be made identified quite early a preferred alternative [49] , [71] . Thus, one may tentatively hypothesize that if the aforementioned theories explain individual decision making, they may apply to group decision making as well.
This makes for a sharp and notable distinction between the aforementioned theories and the theory of rational decision making. In fact, the theory of rational decision making has been designed for one single individual; therefore, it is not obvious that it can be applied to groups or organizations. In order to switch from individual to group decision making, the theory of rational decision making needs to assume power structures and interacting procedures that enable decision makers to reach a compromise. By contrast, the empirical evidence that is reported earlier suggests a pattern for group decision making that is quite similar to individual decision making. Indeed, through group confrontation and discussion, a coherent picture of reality is elaborated where, in the end, one option stands out as the one sensible thing to do. This process is strikingly alike to the processes that the aforementioned theories assume to take place within a single human mind.
The distance between individual and group decision making is short in these theories also because individual decision making is not really conceived as taking places in isolation from the rest of society. On quite many occasions, an individual striving to emphasize one alternative by comparing it to a detestable one is likely do so in a social context where advice is sought, information is gathered, and discussions are made. Thus, individual decision making can be easily seen as embedded in collective decision making, and the distinction between individual and collective decision making tends to disappear.
The theories that are espoused in this section sketch decision making in very broad terms. They are very far from providing tools for mathematical or computational models. Quite recently, and independently from the aforementioned studies, computational cognitive science has provided a neuronal model of decision making that reproduces at least a part of the aforementioned theories. The ensuing section is devoted to this model.
IV. PARALLEL CONSTRAINT SATISFACTION NETWORKS
Parallel constraint satisfaction networks (CSNs) are neural networks that are characterized by: 1) excitatory and inhibitory connections; 2) feedback between neurons. Neurons may represent possibilities, or concepts, or propositions. Connections represent inferences: An excitatory connection from neuron A to neuron B means "A implies B." By contrast, an inhibitory connection would mean "A implies ¬ B."
Let a i denote the activation (the output) of neuron i, with a i ∈ . Likewise, let a j denote the activation of neuron j, where i, j ∈ ℵ. Let w ij ∈ denote the weight by which neuron i multiplies the input arriving from neuron j.
The net excitatory input to neuron i is
The net inhibitory input to neuron i is
At each time step, the activation of neuron i is increased by its excitatory inputs and decreased by its inhibitory inputs
where, in general, a max = 1 and a min = −1. Feedback between neurons make the network maximize consonance C:
w ij a i a j (4) or, equivalently, minimize energy E = −C. Consonance maximization means that those neurons are strengthened that represent possibilities, concepts, or propositions which are coherent with one another. Thus, CSNs can be used to model any cognitive process characterized by search for coherence [23] , [89] . Notable applications of CSNs are the elaboration of scientific theories (understood as arranging empirical findings in a network of coherent causal relations), the evaluation of guilt or innocence in a trial (understood as fitting testimonies in a coherent frame), as well as the Gestalt Psychology's idea that the human mind may shift among alternative interpretations of reality.
As an example, Fig. 4 illustrates a CSN gathering arguments for and against the execution of a serial killer as they were discussed at the time his crimes were discovered [89] . Nodes, which represent concepts, can either receive excitatory inputs (full lines) or inhibitory inputs (dotted lines). In the end, because of the relative weights carried by each signal, one of the opinions marked in bold is selected-either execute or not.
CSNs can reproduce the preference reversals that are mentioned in Section I [7] . In fact, a CSN can either reinforce the choice induced by looking at prizes or the choice induced by looking at the probability to win. Thus, CSNs derive preference reversals from either the construction of salience of the probability to win or the construction of salience of the possible gains. This is precisely the interpretation of preference reversals suggested in Section III [1] , [45] , [80] .
CSNs have been used to model predecisional bolstering of the positive aspects of one alternative at the same time that the negative aspects of its competitors are stressed [76] , [79] . In particular, a fraction of the empirical findings of Section III have also been reproduced by means of CSNs [22] , [35] .
One of these experiments is, here, briefly reported in order to understand the functioning of CSNs [22] . Subjects were, first, presented with general statements likening the Internet either to telephone or to newspapers, then with statements claiming that speech on the Internet should be regulated, as well as statements claiming the opposite. Subsequently, subjects were presented with a case of a company that went bankrupt because a shareholder diffused news on the Internet that the company was having financial troubles. Subjects were asked to take sides, and the evolution of their attitudes was probed at various steps of their decision processes.
As in the experiments that are reported in Section III, subjects lent quite early toward one of the two possible interpretations: Either that the Internet is akin to telephone so speech on the Internet should not be regulated, or that the Internet is akin to newspapers so speech on the Internet should be regulated by libel laws. Probing subjects produced graphs of the kind shown in Fig. 1 , and these graphs were reproduced by the CSN illustrated in Fig. 5 . Fig. 5(a) illustrates the concepts that are involved in this decision problem, with their initial activation levels in shades of gray. These concepts concerned whether messages published by shareholders are true, whether bankruptcy can be caused by shareholder's messages, whether shareholders act in order to protect general interests or out of malicious plans, whether shareholders generally comply with company regulations, whether communication on the Internet should be regulated by the law, and whether the Internet is more akin to newspapers or to a telephone system. In Fig. 5(b) , the network, finally, decided to support the shareholder in this legal case. Notably, this decision was reached by improving the activation of all concepts that support it: Someone who comes to decide in favor of the shareholder develops profound convictions that shareholders' messages may be wrong, that their judgment is Fig. 5 . Network of concepts (a) before the legal case was examined and (b) after it was examined and a judgment was made. Shades of gray denote activation: the darker a concept, the stronger it is believed. Full lines carry excitatory inputs, whereas dashed lines carry inhibitory inputs. T: Is the shareholder's message true? C: Bankrupt has been caused by the shareholder's message (mes), or by mismanagement (mis). M: The shareholder acted out of goodwill motives (goo), or vindictiveness (bad). R: Did the shareholder comply with company regulations? S: There should be freedom of speech on the Internet (fre), or communications should be regulated (reg). A: The best analogy to the Internet is newspapers (nwp), or a telephone system (tel). Freely redrawn from [22] . uninfluent in any case, that this particular shareholder acted in good faith, that he complied with company regulations, that anyone should be allowed to express any opinion on the Internet, and that, being the Internet more akin to a telephone system than to a newspaper, libel laws do not apply.
Thus, CSNs suggest that decision is made once a coherent picture of reality has been formed, a picture that arranges facts and concepts in a sensible sequence, a story that justifies what is being done in the light of what has been done and what will be done [58] . The ensuing Section V will show that the idea that decision making occurs once a coherent narrative has been constructed may ascribe normative value to the new version of Shackle's decision theory outlined in this review.
V. TOWARD A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE THEORY
The theory of rational decision making has been inundated with criticisms based on empirical evidence that this is not the way people actually make decisions. Its proponents have objected that, in fact, the theory of rational decision making is not meant to be a faithful description of what people actually do, but rather a prescription of what they should do. It is a normative theory, not a descriptive theory.
Indeed, since the time of the story of the fox and the wine grapes, the purpose of having an idea of "rationality" is that of telling people how they should make their decisions. Whether people actually conform to rationality principles or do not, this is an empirical question that does not affect our idea of rationality.
Throughout the previous sections, different streams of thought have been linked to one another pointing to something like an embryo of a revival of Shackle's decision theory, where judgments about the likelihood of events (probability) are not independent of judgments about their desirability (utility). The case for this decision theory was made in terms of its stronger descriptive power with respect to the theory of rational decision making. This is quite acceptable for the theory of rational decision making, since it does not attack what it really stands for, namely, its power as a normative theory. However, it is possible to speculate whether this embryonic reformulation of Shackle's decision theory may have a normative value as well.
The principles, schemes, and models that are mentioned in the previous sections pictured decision making as a process oscillating between tightening and loosening the frame of discernment, where the final part of the loosening cycle consists of focusing on one single alternative by contrasting it to a clearly inferior counterpart. This process does not consist of applying preferences to given alternatives as the theory of rational decision making assumes, but rather consists of constructing preferences and conceiving alternatives such that they are coherent with one another. Human minds are viewed as coherence-seeking machines that make use of available information in order to construct a plausible interpretation of reality, be it scientific theories or social roles. By drawing causal relationships and eliminating inconsistencies, decision makers tell themselves stories that explain why certain facts are the way they are and why certain people did what they did. These stories are "narratives."
The construction of a narrative may require that issues that do not fit into the picture are ignored, downplayed, or forgotten. It may require that opinions are changed even dramatically, and yet their purporters candidly claim to have always been coherent in their lives, or at least that they have been coherent if their story is seen from a particular point of view.
Albeit disturbing for our idea of rationality, the extent and easiness with which human beings distort previous experiences is proven by a number of experiments. It has been shown that it is easy to induce the subjects of psychological experiments to change opinion, while they are still convinced to have been coherent throughout the whole experiment [3] - [6] , [64] . Experiments have shown that people construct coherent narratives of their past, and that they remember past events only to the extent that they fit these narratives [17] , [20] , [59] , [60] , [63] , [96] . Other experiments have shown how they may eventually change their interpretation of the past and construct a new narrative if new evidence must be accommodated [10] , [20] , [61] , [62] . All these experiments prove that human beings are ready to lie to themselves in order to build coherent narratives.
This attitude is puzzling, because distorting reality in order to construct a coherent narrative is at odds with our idea of rationality. It is what the fox did, and we are laughing at it since at least three thousand years. Therefore, either human nature is inherently irrational or our idea of rationality is incorrect. Or, at the very least, having a narrative may be so important for human decision making that nearly any price is worth.
Albeit psychological experiments are quite recent, theoretical speculations in this sense do have a tradition in decision theory. According to March and colleagues, reinventing the past is a crucial ability that enables decision makers to conceive new goals and figure out a strategy in an uncertain future [9] , [38] . Later, similar statements have been made by Weick [95] under the label of "sensemaking." Essentially, these authors suggest that in order to make decisions in the face of an uncertain future, it is good to have a narrative that explains the past as if previous decisions had been made along a coherent line. This line guides the decision maker into the future, providing a rationale for action even if certainties are very few.
In business, politics, and other fields, narratives may constitute the bulk of strategies. Yet, it is not easy to get managers, politicians, or other prominent decision makers admit that they do not conform to the prescriptions of rationality. Since our idea of rationality is generally accepted as normative, no one is willing to declare that (s)he is not conforming to its precepts.
Thus, while psychological experiments are many, field case studies are very few. A study of the incremental modifications of the narratives employed by U.S. college presidents carried out by March and commented by Olsen [51] , and a study of the abrupt change of the narrative employed by a Silicon Valley firm carried out by Lane and Maxfield [29] . Moreover, these studies hide many details because the managers concerned did not want to appear as if they changed their mind [14] .
This situation has a somewhat surreal flavor. On one hand, we have a procedure that works, in the sense that reinterpreting the past does enable decision making toward an uncertain future. On the other hand, those who enact this procedure feel ashamed to declare that they do. It does work, but it is carried out in secrecy.
Therefore, here comes a straightforward argument for normativeness. If seeking coherence has the purpose of constructing a narrative, and if narratives are useful, then reinterpreting the past should be openly prescribed. That is, constructing coherent narratives should be encouraged, regarded as "rational," and carried out in sunlight.
What should we think of the fox at the end of this discussion? The issue is whether the future is known or not. If the jumping capabilities of the fox were fixed and accurately measured by her attempts to reach the grapes, then the fox had to update her evaluation of the probability of reaching grapes, accepting the fact that she was unable to get them. That is, if the conditions for our (current) idea of rationality hold, then we are right to laugh at the fox.
Conversely, if her jumping capabilities depended to a large extent on mood, wind, nutrition, and other imponderable factors, then it was good for the fox to convince herself that the grapes were sour. By doing so, she would try again on the next opportunity and-who knows, in an uncertain future-may be one day she would reach the grapes.
It is due to conclude this argument for normativeness with an obvious warning. This warning stems from the fact that recognizing the usefulness of narratives may easily be turned into an invitation to build and believe any narrative, no matter how awkward and senseless it is. Narratives are useful because they make us act, but not every action is right. It is obvious that coherence does not suffice. Social acceptance, compliance with empirical facts, and respect for moral values must be considered as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, many different streams of scientific enquiry have been framed together, which appear to pursue a common goal although from different disciplines and with different methods.
Its first aim was that of providing all researchers working on this subject with a knowledge of what their fellows are doing in seemingly unrelated disciplines or communities, whose results may turn out to be surprisingly similar, relevant, and interesting.
Unfortunately, this has not been the case hitherto. The few economists who know Shackle are unaware that psychologists found experimental support for his intuitions; the psychologists who found experimental evidence that human beings restructure their past into coherent stories are unaware that decision scientists like March and Weick-they themselves independently of one another-had already posed this issue in theoretical terms, whereas Lane and Maxfield carried out their empirical investigation independently of the previous streams of research. Slovic and Lichtenstein, who discovered preference reversals, did establish a fruitful interdisciplinary link to CSNs; nonetheless, adding further conceptual linkages may be useful. Shafer, a mathematician who laid down the general principles that are essential for this emerging theory, is unknown by all other authors. Even within a single discipline, there have been barriers to the circulation of knowledge, for those psychologists who discovered the mechanism of bolstering one alternative while denigrating a poor one in individual decision making, they did it independently of the psychologists who discovered the same mechanism in group decision making.
By framing together all these disparate streams of knowledge, an original contribution emerged. This is entailed in the remarks concerning a possibly normative status for this re-emergent Shackle's decision theory. Indeed, with the possible exception of Shafer, all other streams of research did care about the descriptive adequacy of this theory, but not about prescribing it.
Yet normativeness is of utmost importance. Without normativeness, behavioral decision theories like this are received as minor deviations from expected utility maximization. With normativeness, utility maximization might be conceivably superseeded.
Future formalizations may possibly employ intuitionistic fuzzy sets, which, having both a membership and a nonmembership degree, could capture the process of bolstering one alternative by comparing it to an inferior one. Since (intuitionistic) fuzzy sets require sophisticated computational tools [31] , one may guess that the principles that are gathered in this study will be possibly employed in Artificial Intelligence earlier than anywhere else.
